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Research Summary: We explore how interorganizational
relationships shape firm boundary decisions. Using data
on 545 U.S. medical device manufacturers' product port-
folios and sales-governance choices (i.e., internal or exter-
nal sales forces) from 1983 to 1996, we find relational
capital between manufacturers and external sales forces
influences future firm boundary decisions. Relational cap-
ital lowers the likelihood of integrating the sales function,
but only when firms remain focused on the same product
market. Further, launching an innovative product has a
nuanced effect. For firms lacking relational capital, inno-
vation increases the likelihood of sales integration. This
pattern reverses as relational capital accumulates, but only
when innovations are in the firm's existing focal product
market. Our findings suggest important limits on the effect
of relational governance on firm strategy.
Managerial Summary: Choosing between in-house or
external sales is a key strategic decision. In the medical
device industry, this decision is particularly important
because salespeople are conduits between R&D and cus-
tomers. For firms who initially choose external sales, the
trade-off between maintaining existing links (via external
sales) and developing new, direct relationships (by bringing
sales in-house) can change significantly as product portfo-
lios change. Analyzing 545 U.S. medical device manufac-
turers from 1983 to 1996, we find that existing relationships
with external sales forces reduce the likelihood of bringing
sales in-house, but only when firms remain in the same
product market, such as orthopedic implants. When firms
launch products in new markets, especially innovations,
they are more likely to bring sales in-house.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Organizations involved in economic exchange develop relationships over time. Trust, shared norms,
and routines—the core aspects of relational governance—emerge via repeated exchange, and help to
coordinate activity, incentivize investment in relationship-specific resources, and encourage the
development and transfer of valuable knowledge (Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009; Kotabe, Martin, &
Domoto, 2003; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Prior research links established interorganizational relation-
ships with both future partnering choices and performance (Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013; Gulati, 1995;
Holloway & Parmigiani, 2016). Firms tend to choose the same external partners instead of identify-
ing new ones (Holloway & Parmigiani, 2016; Mayer, Somaya, & Williamson, 2012), and surpris-
ingly, firms even pay a premium to partner with familiar organizations (Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013).
Despite these insights into relational governance, remarkably little empirical research has
explored how and when preexisting relationships between firms influence ongoing firm boundary
decisions.1 Yet, as their product portfolios change, firms may periodically re-evaluate the choice
between continuing to use external partners and integrating key activities. In doing so, firms weigh
the demands of new products and new markets against accumulated relational capital. New require-
ments, such as the need for new types of knowledge, emerge as firms change downstream markets or
innovate, that is, launch new to the world products. Under these conditions, the benefits of bringing
an activity in-house may outweigh existing relational capital. This logic implies an important open
question for strategy scholars: How do preexisting relationships between firms affect future choices
to integrate activities when product portfolios change?
In this paper, we attempt to address this question. We build theory to demonstrate the importance
as well as the limits of relational governance.2 We explore when and how preexisting interorganiza-
tional relationships influence subsequent firm boundary decisions, specifically examining the ongo-
ing choice of medical device firms to integrate (or not) their sales function.
Building from prior work, we expect that firms will be less likely to integrate as they develop
relational capital, which is comprised of the relationship-specific assets that underpin relational gov-
ernance (Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013; Poppo, Zhou, & Zenger, 2008). Our primary argument is that
relational capital is most relevant and valuable when partnering organizations remain working
together in the same product market. Changes to the firm's downstream product market (e.g., for
medical device firms, moving from selling primarily orthopedic to primarily cardiology devices)
diminish the influence of preexisting relationships on integration. Broadly, we argue that relational
capital is embedded in the particular contexts in which it develops, and is, therefore, more consequen-
tial within those contexts.
We also examine how relational capital attenuates the positive relationship between integration
and innovation, which we define as the introduction of new-to-the-world products by the focal firm.
Prior work in transaction-cost economics has theorized and demonstrated that having innovative
products affects the initial decision to integrate, that is, to initially develop an internal sales force
(Anderson, 1985; Weiss & Anderson, 1992). However, the relational governance literature argues
1Outside mainstream strategy research, organizational economics has developed formal theory exploring the related question of how
relational contracts (i.e., self-reinforcing agreements in repeated games) differ if they take place within or between firms, including
how integration (as compared to exchange) affects the temptation to renege in relational contracts (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002).
There has been some limited empirical work in this area (e.g., Gil & Zanarone, 2018), but it has focused on the determinants, preva-
lence, and characteristics of relational contracts rather than on the role of relationships in ongoing firm boundaries.
2Relational governance refers to interfirm exchanges that include and rely on significant relationship-specific assets (Zaheer & Venka-
traman, 1995), otherwise known as relational capital. The latent value of relational capital comes from social connections, norms, trust,
and expectations of exchange continuity (Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013).
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that a preexisting relationship with an external sales force will moderate the push toward integrating
sales if and when firms innovate. We argue the influence of relational capital on the sales integration
decision is limited when a firm attempts to launch an innovation. Specifically, relational capital will
only play a role if the innovation is in the firm's focal downstream market.
To test these ideas, we construct a dataset of 545 U.S. medical device manufacturers that enter
the industry using external sales forces. Starting from their initial entry, we track their mode of
sales—that is, whether they integrate or continue to use external sales—as well their product portfo-
lios, including any innovative products, and other firm characteristics over time. We find evidence
consistent with our theoretical predictions. Specifically, the likelihood of sales integration decreases
with time using external sales provided firms do not change their focal downstream market, whereas
the likelihood of integration does not decrease for firms that change downstream markets. For
instance, a hypothetical firm that sells cardiology products through an external sales force is less
likely to integrate sales over time provided they remain focused on cardiology. Further, we find rela-
tional capital attenuates the positive relationship between launching an innovative product and sales
integration. However, this attenuation is strongest when the innovative product is in the firm's exist-
ing focal downstream market. In other words, if a hypothetical cardiovascular firm launches an inno-
vative orthopedic implant, relational capital makes little difference in mitigating its effect on
integration.
Our paper makes several contributions. First, we contribute to the literature on relational gover-
nance by building and testing theories for when preexisting interfirm relationships influence firm
boundary decisions. By considering the role of preexisting relationships in shaping decisions between
external partnerships and integration (i.e., change in firm boundaries), we complement and extend the
extant relational governance literature, which has primarily focused on choices across different exter-
nal partners. Although we find that relationships may mitigate pressures to integrate, we also find
important limits to this influence, specifically, when firms change downstream focal markets. There-
fore, we provide initial evidence on the context embeddedness of relational capital, a finding not
observed in prior studies. Understanding the limits to relational capital is important both for further
research and for managers implementing integration and partnering strategy. Second, by focusing on
how relational capital can mitigate the push toward integration, not just how it affects the choice
between new or current external partners, we reintegrate relational governance into the larger litera-
ture on boundaries of the firm.
Our work also contributes to the literature that explores how innovation affects the boundaries
of the firm (Kaul, 2012; Teece, 1986). We illuminate how the impact of novel innovation on the
management of complementary downstream activities is contingent on existing relationships when
the firm launches the innovation. Specifically, innovation increases integration likelihood only
when relationships have not yet developed. By extension, our findings provide some explanation
for the lack of firm boundary changes generally observed in prior research (Kapoor, 2013; Qian,
Agarwal, & Hoetker, 2012). Even when innovation increases the need to develop and transfer
new, product-specific knowledge across firm boundaries, established relationships appear to have
a role in mitigating the push toward integration, although it is a more limited role than prior the-
ory predicts.
2 | CONTEXT: MEDICAL DEVICE SALES
This section briefly outlines some key features of the U.S. medical device industry and the sales func-
tion to preface our theoretical development. The U.S. medical device industry includes the producers
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of medical devices and diagnostic tests regulated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA),3
as well as other related medical product suppliers. Medical devices generally fall into discrete medi-
cal specialty areas, reflecting distinct customer markets (i.e., physician specialties), including, for
example, cardiovascular (devices such as artificial hearts and pacemakers) and orthopedics
(e.g., replacement joints), among other specialty groups. We use this relatively clean partitioning to
identify and differentiate the focal downstream markets of the firms in our analyses.
Within this context, our paper focuses on the role of relational capital in ongoing firm boundary
decisions, specifically exploring the sales function and integration. We focus on sales for several rea-
sons. First, in general, sales is an important strategic function. Firms spend 10–40% of their revenue
on sales (Sinha & Zoltners, 2001), which is often more than they spend on research and development,
a subject of considerable inquiry in strategic management (e.g., Ahuja, Lampert, & Tandon, 2008).
Second, and more specific to our theorizing, prior work suggests the choice of sales strategy is of key
importance in settings where the ongoing transfer of knowledge to and from users is crucial for value
creation and value capture (Danneels, 2002; Grant, 1991, 1996), a key feature of the medical device
industry (Chatterji & Fabrizio, 2014; Chatterji, Fabrizio, Mitchell, & Schulman, 2008). Third, prior
research has shown the sales function is particularly important for capturing value from innovative
medical devices (Martin, 1984; Mitchell, 1989; Teece, 1986). For example, in his foundational paper
on complementary assets, Teece (1986) suggested ownership of sales and distribution networks
helped General Electric, a technological follower, to capture the market for Computed tomography
(CT) scanners from the pioneering innovator EMI, which lacked sales assets. Similarly, in the case of
cardiac pacemakers—an “easy to imitate” technology—firms with in-house, specialized sales capa-
bilities performed better than those without (Teece, 1986). Overall, the governance of the sales func-
tion in medical devices offers an interesting and fitting window into understanding the role of
relational capital in firm boundary decisions.
3 | THEORY
Strategy research has long recognized the challenges inherent in coordinating activity across firm
boundaries (Chandler, 1962; Grant, 1991; Williamson, 1971). The prevailing wisdom suggests that
when new, specific investments are required, or when uncertainty about demand or technical aspects
of a product looms large, firms should vertically integrate R&D, manufacturing, sales, and other com-
plementary activities (Teece, 1986; Williamson, 1971).
However, recent theorizing suggests interorganizational relationships that develop between part-
ners can approximate features of vertical integration (Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013; Gibbons & Hender-
son, 2012; Poppo et al., 2008; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Over time, separate and distinct firms can
build trust, develop shared norms that dictate acceptable behavior and facilitate coordination, and cre-
ate and hone routines that enable efficient actions. These features, collectively labeled “relational
capital,” facilitate the development and transfer of relationship-specific knowledge across firm
boundaries (Poppo & Zenger, 2002) and therefore underpin effective relational governance
3The FDA definition of a medical device is “an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or
other similar or related article, including a component part, or accessory which is: (1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or
the United States Pharmacopoeia, or any supplement to them, (2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in
the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or (3) intended to affect the structure or any function
of the body of man or other animals, and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical action within or on
the body of man or other animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of any of its primary
intended purposes” (FDA - CDRH, 2013).
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(Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). Based on past experiences and expecta-
tions of continued future exchange, partnering firms make investments in developing knowledge and
other assets specific to their relationship.
The existing literature has explored the impact of relationships by estimating the effects of
repeated partnering on future external partner choice (Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013; Mayer et al., 2012).
For example, researchers have shown bridge builders repeatedly partner with the same subcontractors
(Holloway & Parmigiani, 2016), and Fortune 500 firms in technology-based industries repeatedly use
the same patent attorneys to file for patents (Mayer et al., 2012).
However, the relational governance literature has generally ignored another viable alternative to
either current or new external partners: bringing the activity in-house. The relationships that develop
over time between firms likely influence the choice to integrate, but prior work offers little explicit
guidance as to how and when. In the following section, we develop theory on when relational capital
influences integration. In doing so, we identify two key variables that will influence the relationship
between relational capital and integration: (a) Whether the firm remains focused on the same down-
stream product market and (b) Whether the firm is commercializing an innovation. We further
explore the interaction of the two by parsing the downstream market of the innovation.
4 | THE LIMITS OF RELATIONAL GOVERNANCE
Relational capital comprises three main elements: shared trust, routines, and norms (Elfenbein &
Zenger, 2013; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Schepker, Oh, Martynov, & Poppo, 2014). Each of these ele-
ments develops between partners over time through repeated exchange. In interfirm relationships,
these core features emerge to coordinate activity, safeguard both partners against opportunistic behav-
iors, and facilitate jointly beneficial knowledge exchange in the absence of a centralized, joint corpo-
rate structure.
First, shared trust in exchange relationships is a set of informed beliefs about the behavior of a
specific person or organization, built up from repeated, successful interactions (Adler, 2001; Bottazzi,
Da Rin, & Hellmann, 2016).4 Having shared trust means an organization is willing to accept risk and
undertake costly actions based on the expectation that another organization will act in a favorable,
mutually beneficial way, and vice versa (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Zaheer, McEv-
ily, & Perrone, 1998). For shared trust to emerge and influence behavior, some risk of deviation and
thereby implicit demonstration of trustworthiness must be present (Rousseau et al., 1998). Such trust-
building risk is a key feature of exchange between firms.
Prior work suggests that similar to shared trust, interfirm routines—routines that cross firm
boundaries—develop over time as products are developed, bought, and sold and know-how is trans-
ferred between the various actors involved (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Feldman & Pentland, 2003;
Zheng & Yang, 2015). Greater experience working with the same partner firm on the same activities
translates into measurable performance benefits (Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002). This logic implies
that, like shared trust, the effect of interfirm routines on the decision to integrate will increase over
time, that is, integration will become less likely as interfirm routines develop.
Finally, repeated exchange also leads to the creation of shared norms of behavior—for example,
shared language and patterns of communication, and mutual understanding of what constitutes
4This concept contrasts with general trust, which is a context-level construct (e.g., How much do I trust a random person or organiza-
tion?). In addition to the role of past experiences in influencing trust, some have argued for an additional basis for trust: calculative
trust, based on the expectation of rewards and penalties, that is, for trust as a forward-looking construct (Poppo, Zhou, & Li, 2016).
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appropriate actions—that underpin effective exchange (Ring & Van De Ven, 1994). Emergent norms
that support exchange include mutual expectations of flexibility, solidarity, joint responsibility,
mutual accommodation, and other behaviors that facilitate ongoing exchange activities between sepa-
rate partners (Cannon, Achrol, & Gundlach, 2000; Macneil, 1980). In sum, shared trust, routines, and
norms—relational capital—develop over time and through repeated exchange, lowering the risk of
opportunistic behavior and easing the development and transfer of relationship-specific knowledge.
4.1 | Context embeddedness of relational capital
The very features that ensure the development of relational capital—repeated exchanges between the
same individuals within the same markets (enabling trust, routines, and norms)—may limit its value
outside the context in which it is developed. If the context changes significantly, even for the same
firm, the relevance and value of relational capital will be diminished. For example, firms may enter a
new market or abandon a legacy market, and in doing so interrupt the development and decrease the
relevance of valuable sales relationships and thus lessen the effect of preexisting relationships on
integration. This boundary condition is an important one not considered in prior work.
In our context of medical device sales, relationships develop through repeated exchange between
the manufacturing firm and sales forces (often focused on narrow medical specialties), as well as
between sales forces and end customers, who typically specialize within single markets
(i.e., physicians within medical specialties). The manufacturer–sales force and sales force–customer
relationships develop in parallel. Specifically, as relational capital develops and facilitates the flow of
knowledge between manufacturers and sales forces, it also develops between the sales representatives
selling the manufacturer's products and their physician customers in the manufacturer's key specialty
areas (e.g., orthopedic surgeons or cardiologists). Supporting this logic, our discussions with industry
experts, supplemented by articles in the trade and popular press, suggest physicians highly value
maintaining their ties to particular sales representatives.5 Sales representative–physician relationships
become “deep personal relationships” over time, built on “the trust level that the physician, the physi-
cian's office and the hospital have with the individual rep” (Snowbeck, 2008).6 Trusted sales repre-
sentatives facilitate knowledge transfer to physicians about how products are intended to be used,
and, conversely, transfer that valuable knowledge back to manufacturers. Similarly, surgeons rely on
a trusted, technically knowledgeable sales representative to attend and observe relevant procedures,
during which their “special product expertise enhances patient safety” by ensuring new devices are
used correctly.7 Knowledgeable, trusted sales representatives also enable efficiency in surgeries.8
When a device manufacturing firm switches its focal downstream market, it changes the set of
physicians and other health professionals it is selling to, and thereby reduces the relevance and value
of its existing relational capital. This change will interrupt the development of each feature of rela-
tional capital. This change will also pervade both parts of the overall sales relationship. In terms of
5Further, the ongoing connection between manufacturers and physicians has been anecdotally described as highly dependent on the
sales representative–physician relationship. For example, Norman Dann, a former venture capitalist and Medtronic executive who
started his career in sales, described an experience in which one of the manufacturers he sold products for ended its relationship with
his sales company (from the Minnesota Star Tribune): “[Dann's] reps had to go to docs and explain that they would no longer be han-
dling a main product line. According to Dann, their response? ‘We don't care, you're still going to be taking care of us, right?’”
6From medical device industry analyst Thomas Gunderson, about a legal case in which medical device firm Ev3 was suing Cardiovas-
cular Systems Inc. for poaching its specialized sales reps.
7Per Medtronic spokesperson Charles Grothaus (Hilzenrath, 2009).
8Stryker CEO Kevin Lobo suggests the detailed knowledge of devices that specialized sales forces hold is “an engine of growth” for
the company (Saxena, 2015), and that without sales representatives' product- and context-specific specialized knowledge, “operating
rooms just don't flow effectively and efficiently” (Johnson, 2015).
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the manufacturer–sales force relationship, given the tendency of sales representatives to focus one or
two narrow specialties, such a change will interrupt the ongoing development of trust, routines, and
norms. With respect to the sales force–end customer relationship, physician–customers in the new
specialty could have little to no history of working with the sales force or the manufacturer. There-
fore, they will have a weak foundation for building shared trust and will lack interorganizational rou-
tines and shared norms of communication to facilitate knowledge transfer.
In sum, our argument is that by interrupting the development of relational capital, changing the
focal downstream market will attenuate the expected negative relationship between the length of time
using an external salesforce and the likelihood of sales integration. Alternatively, for firms that
remain focused on the same downstream market (i.e., the same specialty), the length of time using
external sales further builds and reinforces relational capital and decreases the likelihood of integra-
tion. Therefore, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 1a (H1a) The likelihood of integration decreases with the length of time
using external sales if a firm remains focused on the same focal downstream market.
Hypothesis 1b (H1b) The likelihood of integration does not decrease with the length of
time using external sales if a firm changes its focus to a different downstream market.
Next, we explore how relational capital influences integration choices when the development and
transfer of new knowledge become essential, as is the case when a firm innovates, that is, launches a
product that is new-to-the-world. Prior literature suggests competing hypotheses for how innovation
will shape firm boundary choices. However, reconciling the seemingly opposing predictions offers us
the chance to tighten our logic about the influence of relational capital on integration.
On one hand, a transaction-cost view would imply innovation—which increases in the need for
the development and transfer of relationship-specific knowledge—is a potential driver of integration
(Macher, 2006; Williamson, 1993). Introducing and commercializing an innovative product requires
the development and transfer of new, specific knowledge about how to use and sell the product.
Therefore, novel innovation requires both the manufacturer–innovator and sales force to make such
investments, and for each to rely on the commitment of the other to transfer knowledge. A classic
transaction-cost argument would suggest that as the need for specific investments increases, the risk
of opportunism in interfirm transactions also increases (Anderson, 1985; Argyres & Zenger, 2012;
Williamson, 1971). Following such logic, we would expect that introducing an innovative product
will increase the likelihood of integration.
On the other hand, a relational governance approach suggests innovation increases the value of
accumulated relational capital, thereby further inhibiting integration (Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013).
Specifically, the relational governance literature suggests that when the need for knowledge develop-
ment and exchange increases, relational capital will have an even higher value for exchange partners
(Elfenbein, 2007). Therefore, prior research in this tradition argues that innovation lowers the likeli-
hood of changing external partners. In our context, this logic implies that when a (medical device)
firm has relational capital with an external sales firm, innovation should decrease the likelihood of
integration.
To reconcile these perspectives, we build from the idea that relational capital builds up through
repeated exchange over time. Therefore, if relational capital matters, we should expect the relation-
ship between innovation and integration to change over time. Following the transaction-cost logic,
we hypothesize that adding an innovative product early in the firm's early days in using external
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sales, that is, when the firm has accumulated little relational capital, will increase a firm's likelihood
of integration. Similarly, if a firm adds an innovative product after a few years of using external sales,
that is, once it has already developed relational capital with its external sales partner, this change will
decrease the firm's likelihood of integration. Therefore, we formulate two additional hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a (H2a) For firms without relational capital, that is, those that have used
external sales for a relatively short period of time, the likelihood of integration
increases when they launch an innovation.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b) For firms with relational capital, that is, those who have used
external sales for a relatively long period of time, the likelihood of integration
decreases when they launch an innovation.
Further, building from our arguments in Hypothesis 1, we argue that the value of relational capital in
moderating the impact of innovation on the decision to integrate will depend on the whether the
innovation is in the firm's focal downstream market. This additional nuance stems from the
context-dependent value of relational capital described above. That is, whether the length of time
using external sales moderates the relationship between innovation and integration will depend on
whether the requisite knowledge to effectively sell the innovation can be created and transferred
within the established sales channel. For example, consider a cardiology-focused firm introducing
either an innovative cardiac catheter or an innovative dialysis catheter (used by endocrinologists). If
the required knowledge of how to use and sell the innovative product is likely accessible within the
existing sales channel since the device is within its existing focal downstream market (i.e., the cardio-
vascular device), relational capital will decrease the likelihood of integration. Firms can use the rela-
tionships they have with their sales force and customers to effectively sell and distribute these
innovations. However, if the required knowledge is not accessible within the existing channel
(i.e., for the endocrine device), the relevance of the firm's existing relational capital will be lower and
the likelihood of integration postinnovation will be higher. Thus, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 3a (H3a) The likelihood of integration for firms with relational capital,
that is, those that have used external sales for a relatively long period of time,
decreases when they launch an innovation within their focal downstream market.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b) The likelihood of integration for firms with relational capital,
that is, those that have used external sales for a relatively long period of time, increases
when they launch an innovation outside their focal downstream market.
5 | DATA AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH
We test our hypotheses by looking at a panel of firm divisions in the U.S. medical device industry.
To build our sample, we use the Medical Device Register (MDR) directory for the years 1983–1996.
The MDR is a directory of U.S. medical device manufacturers (Cecchino, 2010; Medical Device
Register, 2012; Prasek, 1999). It includes a listing of the types of products sold by each manufacturer
(at the division level) in each year, the medical specialties for each product (e.g., Cardiovascular),
and, at the firm-division level (e.g., 3M Imaging Systems), the mode of sales, number of employees,
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and other descriptive information. We use the yearly MDR directories to create a firm-division-year
panel of medical devices marketed and sales mode used (i.e., external sales or internal sales). Thus,
our unit of analysis is the firm division year. We observe all firm divisions entering in 1984 or later
for which we know the full history of products and sales relationships. For our main analyses, we use
the 545 firm divisions that start out using an external sales force.
Along with the MDR, we employ FDA medical device classification data. We use the standard-
ized, generic product name listed in the MDR (e.g., “Prosthesis, Shoulder”) to link to FDA data at
the product level. We categorize products that entered the market during the first approval year for
their respective FDA product category as “innovative products.”9 Overall, we consider innovative
products to signify devices that require new, product-specific, tacit information about their use to be
transferred via the manufacturer–sales force and sales force–customer interfaces. To test Hypotheses
1a and 1b, we need to identify a firm's focal downstream market. We define the focal downstream
market of each firm division (in each year) as the medical specialty in which it has the largest number
of products. Relatedly, to test Hypotheses 3a and 3b, we segment innovative products as either within
or outside the existing focal downstream market (specialty) of the firm. The MDR data also lists the
corporate parent of each firm division (if any) in each year. Using this information, we create
corporate-level firm-year measures, including the share of codivisions with internal sales forces, and
document any changes to ownership of firm divisions over time.
To generate our final analytical sample of 545 firm divisions that start out using external sales,
we first drop those firm divisions that did not have information on our key measures.10 Because many
of our explanatory and control variables are lagged year-over-year changes, and our dependent vari-
able is forward-looking, we also omit a small number of firm divisions for which we have limited
time series. Finally, we drop from our main sample firms that initially use internal sales forces (inter-
nal-first manufacturers). We use this internal-first sample (1,070 firms) in supplementary analyses to
correct for initial sales mode selection (described in detail below). Firm divisions enter our analytical
sample in the year they first market a product. Those that integrate leave our analytical sample in the
year of integration. Those that retain external sales leave our analysis either the year of firm-division
exit or in 1996 (the end of our observation window). In our main analyses, we follow 545 “external-
first” firm divisions for an average of 5 years (2,798 firm-division years), including 102 integration
events.11
We estimate the relationship between product changes in year t and integration events in year t
+ 1. In other words, we are not modeling the relationship between concurrent firm characteristics
and sales-force types, but instead the relationship between product changes and the likelihood of sub-
sequent integration. We did so to reduce the potential for reverse causality, as prior literature has
9Information on FDA product classifications can be found on the FDA website: https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/
cfPCD/classification.cfm. Product categories (there are ~6,000) are akin to the generic name of products listed in the MDR,
e.g., “Implant, Fixation Device, Spinal” or “Graft, Vascular, Synthetic/Biologic Composite.” We used the FDA product-approvals data-
bases to flag the first year of product approval for each category as the first year a product was approved in that category. For example,
the first “Implant, Fixation Device, Spinal,” code JDN, was approved in 1987.
10The raw MDR data contains information for 5,768 firm divisions. Our main analysis includes only firms that enter using external
sales (approximately one third of all firms). We necessarily include only firms that entered in 1984 or after. We also drop firm divisions
from our sample that had no products, or no sales/distribution information, or those outside the United States. Because our analyses are
focused on innovation and sales, we drop those that only distribute products for other firms, and, firm divisions that manufacture prod-
ucts for others but do not develop new products. Finally, we drop firm divisions without key control variables, for example, employees,
and those in our sample for 3 years or less, because we use lagged variables and have a forward-looking dependent variable.
11These numbers are for the full analytical sample. In the IPW analysis (described below), we trim divisions due to non-overlapping
propensity scores, that is, their estimated likelihood of being internal-first was lower than any of the internal-first sample (10 firms and
41 observations). The internal-first sample used only to construct the propensity-score weighting, is 1,070 firm divisions (5,032 firm-
division years) and 59 outsourcing events.
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suggested complementary activities, including sales, can shape both the likelihood of innovation and
firm outcomes (Dosi, 1982; Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000).
Importantly for our theory, during our sample period (1983–1996), physicians had significant
freedom to make purchasing decisions (Anderson, 2012; Makower, Yock, & Zenios, 2010; Schafer,
2013), and, correspondingly, device firms cultivated close relationships with key physicians
(Chatterji & Fabrizio, 2014; Chatterji et al., 2008).12 Building on that point, our conversations with
medical device sales managers confirmed the importance of sales-force continuity for maintaining
important manufacturer–customer relationships. Last, the market for external distributors of medical
devices was relatively competitive during our analysis period (Cohen, 1999), suggesting the avail-
ability of distributors did not constrain the choice between internal and external sales, leaving room
for manufacturers to freely choose their sales strategy.13
5.1 | Measures
5.1.1 | Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is an event variable that takes the value of 0 for all years the firm division
uses external sales, and a value of 1 if and when it integrates sales.14 Because we are running event-
history analyses (described below), we drop the firm divisions from the analytical sample for the
years after integration, because they are no longer at risk. Firm divisions that never integrate sales are
0 for all years they remain in the sample until either firm exit or 1996. Variables and data sources are
described below (and in Table 1).
5.1.2 | Key explanatory variables
Following the prior literature, we use length of time as a proxy measure for relational capital
(Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013; Kotabe et al., 2003). Concretely, we use years using external sales
(in 2-year bands). As argued in Hypothesis 1a, we expect time using external to be negatively related
to integration for firms that maintain the same focal downstream market. However, we don't expect
this negative relationship for firms that change their focal downstream market (Hypothesis 1b). A
change in a firm's focal downstream market is defined as a change in its focal medical specialty
(e.g., from Cardiovascular to General Surgery).
To test Hypotheses 2, we explore how time using external sales moderates the relationship
between innovation and the likelihood of integration. We use innovative product introductions to rep-
resent changes in the need for the development and sharing of new, relationship-specific knowledge.
To further explore the moderating effect of time using external sales, and to test Hypotheses 3a and
3b, we look at how innovation within the focal downstream market (focal medical specialty) versus
outside the focal downstream market differs in terms of the consequences for the likelihood of
integration.
12In more recent years, administrators with a cost-minimization focus have been increasingly making device-purchasing decisions at a
hospital or hospital-systems level, not physicians at the individual or practice level.
13Although hybrid forms of sales governance have become more popular since the early 2000s in medical devices as well as other
industries (Zoltners, Sinha, & Lorimer, 2004), hybrid sales forces—the simultaneous use of both internal and external sales— were rare
during our window of analysis. They are also rare in our data set because we are looking at sales governance at the firm-division level,
allowing for heterogeneity among divisions within the same firm. Because of the layer of complication that hybrids add theoretically
(Krzeminska, Hoetker, & Mellewigt, 2013; Parmigiani, 2007), and because we do not have access to more recent data, we leave explo-
ration of hybrid modes to future studies. We discuss our empirical approach for dealing with the few hybrids that emerge in our data in
the results section.
14To construct this measure, we group MDR distribution types into external sales (distributor, manufacturer through distributor, dealer,
manufacturer through dealer) and internal sales (manufacturer direct, direct, sold direct, manufacturer through manufacturer reps).
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5.1.3 | Control variables
To isolate the relationship between our key predictors and the likelihood of integration, we control
for other relevant firm-division, corporate, and specialty-level factors. To account for firm-division
growth, which may contribute to the feasibility of integration, we control for lagged changes in the
number of firm-division employees. We expect the relationship between growth and the likelihood of
integration to be positive. Further, we control for changes to the number of products sold by the firm
(changes in size) and changes in the number of specialties (changes in scope), both of which shape
the marginal costs of having internal versus external sales (Chandler & Hikino, 1994). We expect
increases in size to have a positive relationship with integration, and we expect the reverse to be true
for increases in scope (controlling for size). We also control for several corporate-level changes and
characteristics, including the share of other medical device subsidiaries of the same corporation with
TABLE 1 Description of variables, measures, data sources used in main analysis
Covariates Measures Data sources
Dependent variable
Integration Event: external-first sample = 0 for all years from entry into
dataset for which a firm division used external sales; =1 if
integrated sales.
Medical Device
Register (MDR)
Key explanatory variables
Years using external sales Four categories: (1) if the firm division has been using external
sales for 1–2 years (ref. category), 3–4 years, 5–6 years, or
7 or more years. (t−1)
MDR
Specialty (Δ) =1 if firm-division changes their main specialty from (t−2) to
(t−1). A firm's main specialty is the medical specialty within
which the firm has the most products in each year.a
MDR
Innovative product (Δ) Increase (or decrease) in the count of innovative products sold
by the firm division. Innovative products are those launched
by the firm in the year such products are first approved by
the FDA (t−1) – (t−2).
MDR;
FDA Medical Device
Product Classification
Database
Controls – Firm-division level
# products (Δ) Change in the count of products sold by the firm-division (t−1)
– (t−2).
MDR
# specialties (Δ) Change in the count of specialties in which the firm division
currently sells products (t−1) – (t−2).
MDR
# division employees (Δ) Change in number of employees (000 s) (t−1) – (t−2). MDR
# products at entry Count of products sold by the firm division its entry year. MDR
# specialties at entry Count of specialties in which the firm division markets products
in its entry year.
MDR
# patents at entry Count of filed USPTO patent applications at entry. USPTO
# innovations at entry Count of innovative products (as defined above) in the product
portfolio of the firm division in entry year.
MDR; FDA
Region U.S. Census region based on the state of firm division;
Northeast, Midwest, South, and West.
MDR
Controls – Corporate level
The share of integrated sales
(of codivisions with the
same parent)
Number of firm divisions with the same corporate parent that
have integrated sales (t−1).
MDR
Firm size (# divisions) (Δ) Change in the count of divisions of the parent firm from (t−2)
to (t−1).
MDR
Ownership change (Δ) =1 if parent firm changed (t−1). MDR
a For example, J&J Cardiovascular's main specialty throughout the analysis is Cardiovascular.
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internal sales, share internal, which we expect to have a positive relationship with integration at the
firm-division level. Finally, we account for any changes to ownership of the firm division.
To control for variations in the supply of external sales, we include location (region) dummies.
We also include two dummies for diagnostic-focused firm divisions—laboratory diagnostic and radi-
ology specialties—because these specialties involve the development of, respectively, tests used in
clinical labs, or large capital purchases purchased at the hospital level, and are therefore sold differ-
ently than single-use tools and implantable devices. We include a dummy for post-1990 years to act
as a control for aggregate-level changes in the supply of external sales forces over time.15 We also
control for changes in the number of competitor firms focused in the same specialty (# competitors)
as a measure of changes in demand for external sales and other changes to the competitive environ-
ment of the firm using the full MDR data.
Lastl, we control for measures of the firm product and technology portfolio at the time of entry,
including the initial counts of products, specialties, innovative products, and filed patent applications.
To obtain information on patents, we used the Harvard Patent Network Dataverse patent dataset (Lai,
D'Amour, Yu, & Fleming, 2011), which covers USPTO patents granted from 1975 to 2010. We
linked the firm divisions to patent-assignee names. We counted only medical device patents (identi-
fied based on USPTO classifications). Because of knowledge development and transfer needs, we
expect that firms with external sales that enter with patents (i.e., the antecedent of innovative prod-
ucts) or innovative products may be more likely to integrate in the future.
5.2 | Econometric analysis of events
Since we use discrete, annual data to explore our hypotheses relating relationships and product
changes to sales-related integration, we employ discrete event history analysis (EHA) techniques.
EHA methods predict the conditional probability of an event occurring given that it has yet to happen
within a population at risk of the event (Allison, 1984; Singer & Willett, 2003). In our case, discrete
EHA is preferable to continuous-time methods because we do not know the precise timing of sales
integration within each year, and because we have numerous simultaneous events or ties (i.e., more
than one event in each year) (Allison, 2010; Franco, Sarkar, Agarwal, & Echambadi, 2009). For the
population under study, the conditional probability of the event using discrete EHA is:
Pit ¼Pr Ti ¼ tjTi≥t, xit,½
where T is the discrete time of event occurrence and x is a vector of explanatory and control variables
predicting event occurrence. EHA allows us to identify factors associated with change events. Dis-
crete EHA can be estimated using maximum likelihood methods (Allison, 1984; Singer & Willett,
2003); for our main analyses, we used a complementary log–log model16 and lagged our explanatory
and control variables:
Pr Integrationi ¼ 1ð jxit−1Þ¼ 1− exp − exp xit−1βð ÞÞð :
15Results are robust to more disaggregated specialties and additional year controls, although lack of events in certain specialties and
years means some observations are dropped.
16The complementary log–log model is recommended when modeling events (or nonevents) that are rare, because the function is asym-
metrical. We also ran all models using a logit model (Allison, 2010), and our results were the same qualitatively and in terms of statisti-
cal significance. Further, given the events are relatively rare, to supplement the logistic regressions, we also estimated firth logit
models, and again our results were the same qualitatively and in terms of statistical significance (available from authors).
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5.3 | Self-selection into sales mode at entry
An important potential source of bias in our estimates comes from the fact that firm divisions are not
randomly assigned into their initial sales-governance mode. Firm divisions will vary in their likeli-
hood of choosing integrated or external sales when they first enter, depending on initial transaction
costs, capabilities, and the market for knowledgeable sales representatives at the time. In other words,
observable factors, such as firm-division size and scope, whether the firm has an innovative product
(or the foundational idea for an innovative product, i.e., a patent), its focal specialty, location, the size
of its parent firm, and when it enters, will likely shape this initial choice. Failing to control for initial
selection may pollute our estimates of the influence of both relational capital and innovation on the
likelihood of integration. To control for self-selection on observables, we estimate firms' propensity
to have integrated sales at entry based on the above listed observable characteristics at entry, and both
balance and reweight our data using inverse propensity scores (Bennett, 2013; Hirano & Imbens,
2001). We describe and document this process in detail in the related results section below as well as
in the Appendix S1. All analyses are run in Stata 14.
6 | RESULTS
Over the full period of our analyses, we find sales integration is a relatively rare event with just a
3.5% baseline annual likelihood of integration throughout our sample period.17
Our main regression results are provided in Tables 2 and 3 (and corresponding average marginal
effects in Tables 4 and 5 and Figures 1 and 2). Table 2 details our main tests for Hypotheses 1a and
1b. As a baseline (column 1), we see that, compared to the reference category of 1–2 years using
external sales, firms are less likely to integrate the longer they use external sales. The relationship
isn't linear: the average marginal decrease in the likelihood of integration compared to the likelihood
in the first 2 years is 2.8% in years 3 and 4, 2.7% in years 5 and 6, and 1.7% in years 7 or more. In
column 3, we explore Hypotheses 1a and 1b by interacting time using external sales and focal spe-
cialty change in predicting the likelihood of integration. We expect time using external sales to have
a negative relationship with integration likelihood only for those firms that don't change their focal
specialties because changing downstream market focus inhibits the development of relational capital.
The regression results indicate support for our hypotheses because the baseline coefficients on time
remain negative (for firms without a specialty change). Because we estimate a nonlinear regression,
true interaction effects are best described via average marginal effects. As summarized in Table 4
(and Figure 1), firms that don't change their focal specialty have an average marginal decrease in the
likelihood of integration of 3.4% in years 3 to 4 and 3.0% in years 5 to 6 as compared to the first
2 years. By contrast, for firms that do change their focal specialty, we find no evidence of a signifi-
cant decrease in the likelihood of integration over time using external sales.
In Table 3, we test Hypotheses 2a and 2b by exploring the association between innovation and
the likelihood of integration, and we evaluate how this relationship varies across time using external
sales. We predict that innovating when little to no relational capital exists will increase the likelihood
of integration (Hypothesis 2a), whereas innovating when relational capital has developed will
decrease the likelihood of integration (Hypothesis 2b). Consistent with Hypothesis 2a, and with a
standard TCE logic, adding an innovative product is associated with an increase in the likelihood of
integration on average (by 2.8%), but only if the product is added in early on in the use of external
17Notably, outsourcing by firms who enter using internal sales is even less common than integration (annually 1.1%). As an aside, most
medical device firms enter using internal sales (66%).
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TABLE 2 Time using external sales, change in focal downstream market (specialty), and the likelihood of integration
Inverse propensity-score weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Main variables
Years using external (3–4) −0.781 −0.787 −0.944 −1.002 −1.009 −1.141
(0.313) (0.315) (0.348) (0.376) (0.378) (0.423)
Years using external (5–6) −0.747 −0.756 −0.764 −0.553 −0.572 −0.549
(0.336) (0.336) (0.344) (0.415) (0.410) (0.420)
Years using external (7+) −0.391 −0.387 −0.452 −0.525 −0.513 −0.584
(0.289) (0.289) (0.310) (0.366) (0.363) (0.391)
Specialty change (Δ) −0.267 −0.608 −0.684 −0.970
(0.305) (0.491) (0.360) (0.575)
Specialty (Δ) * Years (3–4) 1.033 1.064
(0.803) (0.889)
Specialty (Δ) * Years (5–6) −0.070 −0.790
(1.161) (1.223)
Specialty (Δ) * Years (7+) 0.523 0.645
(0.693) (0.796)
Controls
# products (Δ) 0.055 0.056 0.057 0.057 0.061 0.060
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036)
# specialties (Δ) −0.528 −0.550 −0.570 −0.364 −0.388 −0.378
(0.204) (0.213) (0.223) (0.361) (0.405) (0.420)
# division employees (Δ) −0.039 −0.040 −0.034 −0.003 −0.013 −0.003
(0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.035) (0.038)
Firm size (# divisions) (Δ) −0.010 −0.010 −0.012 0.108 0.108 0.104
(0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.132) (0.129) (0.129)
Share internal (corporate level) 0.414 0.417 0.428 0.372 0.413 0.425
(0.292) (0.294) (0.293) (0.360) (0.358) (0.357)
Ownership change −0.023 −0.022 −0.010 −1.062 −1.005 −1.010
(0.497) (0.496) (0.496) (0.991) (0.955) (0.968)
# competitors (Δ) −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.009 −0.009 −0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
# products at entry −0.030 −0.033 −0.034 −0.030 −0.041 −0.042
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025)
# specialties at entry 0.061 0.078 0.082 −0.003 0.058 0.063
(0.082) (0.086) (0.086) (0.094) (0.106) (0.106)
# patents at entry 0.076 0.074 0.073 0.061 0.055 0.054
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
# innovations at entry 0.098 0.096 0.095 0.138 0.136 0.138
(0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065)
Year, region, specialty controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
N (firm-division years) 2,798 2,798 2,798 2,739 2,739 2,739
n (firm divisions) 545 545 545 534 534 534
Events 102 102 102 101 101 101
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sales. Specifically (Table 5), in year 1 or 2, adding such a product increases the likelihood of integra-
tion by 9.7%, whereas adding such a product later on has no relationship with integration likelihood
in later years (0.6% in years 3–4, −0.2% in years 5–6, 1.4% in years 7 or more), which is consistent
with Hypothesis 2b.
To test Hypotheses 3a and 3b, we separate innovative products into within versus outside spe-
cialty. We see that innovative products within the focal specialty drive our overall results (Table 3);
however, we also see innovative products outside the focal specialty are not associated with an
increased likelihood of integration (Hypothesis 3b). Table 5 and Figure 2 highlight the differences in
marginal effects for within versus outside focal specialty innovations.
6.1 | Controlling for initial sales self-selection
As mentioned above, the firms in our samples select whether to enter the industry using an internal
or external sales force. Therefore, the above analyses estimate the likelihood of integration among
those firm divisions that first chose to use external sales. A potential concern with such analyses is
that firms that first choose external sales likely do so based on performance expectations, and as such,
are both unlikely to integrate for reasons other than relational capital and are also more likely to
remain in the sample (and not exit). A popular method to control for selection in strategy research is
the Heckman method (Shaver, 1998). However, it was designed for use in linear regression models
(i.e., OLS) and our main analysis uses a nonlinear survival model (cloglog). Therefore, we instead
use the inverse propensity weight (IPW) method to control for selection based on baseline observ-
ables. In estimating the likelihood of integration, the IPW method down weights those firms that have
a high propensity to be external-first, where propensity is estimated based on entry characteristics.
Table 6 describes the balance between the external and internal first samples pre- and post-trimming
and after propensity weights are applied. Further, the Appendix S1 describes the IPW method in
more detail, and Tables S1 and Figures S1 and S2, Supporting information, detail the analysis for
estimating and evaluating the weights. The IPW versions of our main results are generally consistent
with our findings without controlling for initial selection (see Tables 2 and 3, columns labeled
“Inverse propensity weighted”).
6.2 | Competing risks model to control for firms that exit
To further check the robustness of our main findings, we ran supplementary analyses that include the
likelihood of firm exit as a competing potential outcome. Some firms in our sample exit during our
study period. Therefore, we want to ensure our findings are driven by comparing firms that integrate
sales with those that survive but do not integrate, and not by comparing firms that change sales with
failing (or acquired) firms. Tables S2 and S3 provide the results from multinomial logit discrete event
hazard regressions with three outcomes: survive but don't integrate sales (our reference category),
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Inverse propensity-score weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LL −415.2 −414.8 −413.9 −1,302 −1,294 −1,290
Chi square (p) 72.49 72.55 73.52 71.82 78.88 81.07
Note. All RHS variables are lagged by one period. All models also include controls for diagnostic specialties (lab and radiology sepa-
rately), region fixed effects, and a variable for years after 1990.
Robust standard errors (clustered at the parent firm level) in parentheses.
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TABLE 3 Time using external sales, innovation, and the likelihood of integration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inverse propensity-score weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main variables
Years using external (3–4) −0.776 −0.723 −0.779 −0.735 −0.997 −0.961 −1.001 −0.964
(0.312) (0.317) (0.314) (0.315) (0.376) (0.383) (0.378) (0.381)
Years using external (5–6) −0.763 −0.711 −0.755 −0.717 −0.564 −0.524 −0.560 −0.524
(0.338) (0.338) (0.337) (0.335) (0.415) (0.417) (0.415) (0.416)
Years using external (7+) −0.392 −0.371 −0.390 −0.372 −0.527 −0.508 −0.525 −0.507
(0.289) (0.290) (0.288) (0.288) (0.366) (0.368) (0.365) (0.367)
Innovation (Δ) 1.206 1.921 1.332 1.973
(0.461) (0.598) (0.552) (0.662)
Innovation * Years (3–4) −1.681 −1.686
(0.658) (0.775)
Innovation * Years (5–6) −2.032 −1.901
(0.659) (0.708)
Innovation * Years (7+) −1.493 −1.634
(0.733) (0.763)
Innovation within (Δ) 1.255 1.779 1.482 2.123
(0.620) (0.772) (0.718) (0.791)
Innovation within * Years (3–4) −1.433 −1.663
(0.873) (0.994)
Innovation within * Years (5–6) −1.671 −1.911
(0.824) (0.828)
Innovation within * Years (7+) −1.660 −2.042
(0.953) (0.927)
Innovation outside (Δ) 0.623 1.131 0.333 0.726
(0.656) (1.114) (0.603) (0.938)
Innovation outside * Years (3–4) −1.129 −0.976
(1.156) (1.024)
Innovation outside * Years (5–6) −1.246 −0.712
(1.201) (1.061)
Innovation outside * Years (7+) −0.493 −0.179
(1.221) (1.001)
Controls
# products (Δ) 0.053 0.050 0.052 0.050 0.045 0.034 0.042 0.032
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.037) (0.040) (0.038) (0.041)
# specialties (Δ) −0.543 −0.543 −0.538 −0.542 −0.358 −0.344 −0.354 −0.340
(0.204) (0.202) (0.203) (0.201) (0.370) (0.368) (0.368) (0.366)
# division employees (Δ) −0.040 −0.040 −0.039 −0.039 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.002
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
# products at entry −0.032 −0.035 −0.032 −0.035 −0.033 −0.035 −0.033 −0.036
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
# specialties at entry 0.060 0.065 0.064 0.069 −0.003 0.005 −0.001 0.007
(0.083) (0.082) (0.080) (0.079) (0.096) (0.096) (0.094) (0.093)
# patents at entry 0.076 0.079 0.077 0.078 0.062 0.063 0.062 0.063
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survive and integrate sales (the event of interest), and exit (the competing event). These results are
consistent with our main findings.
6.3 | Alternative explanations and robustness checks
In our analyses, we do not observe the external sales firm used by the focal manufacturer firm. We
only see the focal firm's mode of sales over time. Yet firms may change their external sales partner
(e.g., from sales company X to sales company Y). Although prior relational governance research and
sales-governance studies suggest switching from one external partner to another is uncommon in part
TABLE 3 (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inverse propensity-score weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
# innovations at entry 0.100 0.105 0.095 0.100 0.142 0.146 0.139 0.146
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069)
Firm, competition, year, region,
specialty controls
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N (firm-division years) 2,798 2,798 2,798 2,798 2,739 2,739 2,739 2,739
Chi square (p) 74.68 79.84 74.95 82.61 75.29 83.92 76.97 92.76
Note. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) in parentheses.
TABLE 4 Marginal effects of years using external sales and moderating effect of a change in specialty, on integration
likelihood (average marginal effects (ref: Years since entry = 1–2)
External Specialty change = 0 Specialty change = 1
Years using external (3–4) −0.028 −0.034 0.003
(0.010) (0.011) (0.024)
Years using external (5–6) −0.027 −0.030 0.018
(0.012) (0.013) (0.021)
Years using external (7+) −0.017 −0.020 0.002
(0.012) (0.014) (0.021)
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE 5 Marginal effect of innovative product launches, on integration likelihood across categories of years using external
sales (average marginal effects)
All innovations Inside innovation Outside innovation
Years using external (1–2) 0.097 0.090 0.057
(0.032) (0.039) (0.056)
Years using external (3–4) 0.006 0.008 0.000
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Years using external (5–6) −0.002 0.003 −0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011)
Years using external (7+) 0.014 0.003 0.022
(0.013) (0.018) (0.017)
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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due to the significant switching costs involved (Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013; Holloway & Parmigiani,
2016; Weiss & Anderson, 1992), we cannot rule out such changes. If firms do change external sales
partners, our measure of relational capital (i.e., time using external sales) will be an overestimate.
Helpfully, this mismeasurement biases us against finding a negative relationship between time using
external sales and integration likelihood. However, we hope future research can include both external
partner choice and integration to fully characterize how relational capital shapes governance-mode
choices over time.
Given that we infer relational capital from time using external sales, a further potential concern is
that our measure captures other features that develop over time and might affect the choice to inte-
grate, including, notably, governance capabilities (Aggarwal & Hsu, 2009). Our results are, however,
not consistent with a straightforward governance capabilities logic. First, we find firms that change
specialties (but continue to use external sales) are not less likely to integrate over time, which sug-
gests the effects we are identifying are more narrowly defined than firm-level capabilities. Second, if
we run our same analyses on internal-first firms, we find no evidence that firms using internal sales
are less likely to outsource over time, suggesting time using a particular sales mode provides a poor
proxy for integrative (i.e., mode-specific governance) capabilities (results available from authors).18
In our analyses, we implicitly assume the degree to which firms have a choice to integrate is inde-
pendent of scale. An alternative view would be that very small firms cannot feasibly integrate
-3.4% -3.0%
-2.0%
0.3%
1.8%
0.2%
-5.0%
-3.0%
-1.0%
1.0%
3.0%
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3 to 4 years 5 to 6 years 7+ years
No specialty change Specialty change
FIGURE 1 Marginal change in likelihood of integration (relative to 1 to 2 years) using external sales
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1 to 2 years 3 to 4 years 5 to 6 years 7+ years
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FIGURE 2 Marginal change in likelihood of integration associated with innovation
18We also explore how time using internal sales relates to the likelihood of outsourcing for organizations that are (a) new divisions of
existing firms compared to (b) organizations that are new, standalone firms. If new divisions of existing firms with integrated sales are
more likely to already have an integrative capability they may bias us against finding a result. However, controlling for these issues did
not affect our results.
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(e.g., because of prohibitive setup costs), and thus some of our sample is not at risk of integration.
Several descriptive facts suggest this is not an issue. First, if we look at the initial choices of sales-
governance mode and compare the size of firms with internal versus external sales at entry, we find
firms with more products are less likely to choose internal sales at entry (average size of product port-
folio for internal-first firms is 6 versus 8 for external-first firms, Table 6). Second, division size has
no significant relationship with either initial sales choice or likelihood of later integration (results
available from authors).
Later in our sample period, firm divisions that use both external and internal sales—or hybrid
sales forces—emerge, suggesting some firm divisions go from using purely external sales to partial
integration. In our analyses, we treat these occurrences (six events, or ~6% of the total) as if they
TABLE 6 Characteristics at entry for the external-first sample and internal-first sample
Prematch, pretrim sample
N = 1,615
(545 external-first, 1,070 internal-first)
Post-match, post-trim sample
N = 1,598
(534 external-first, 1,064 internal-first)
External
First
Internal
First %bias
p value
(t-test)
External
First
Internal
First %bias
p value
(t-test)
# patents 0.52 1.03 9.50 0.11 0.77 0.72 −1.90 0.70
# products 8.11 5.89 −18.00 0.00 6.36 5.86 −4.20 0.26
# specialties 2.45 2.08 −20.70 0.00 2.14 2.08 −3.80 0.34
# innovative products 0.79 0.51 −12.20 0.02 0.51 0.51 0.00 0.99
Firm size (# divisions) 3.49 3.39 −1.70 0.74 3.17 3.39 3.80 0.35
Region
Northeast 0.45 0.33 −23.60 0.00 0.32 0.33 3.40 0.42
Midwest 0.24 0.21 −8.10 0.12 0.19 0.21 4.20 0.31
West 0.17 0.28 27.20 0.00 0.31 0.28 −7.60 0.11
South 0.15 0.18 9.60 0.07 0.19 0.18 −0.60 0.90
Specialty
Anesthesiology/Pul med 0.05 0.04 −3.50 0.50 0.05 0.04 −0.90 0.83
Cardiovascular 0.04 0.08 15.80 0.00 0.11 0.08 −14.50 0.01
Dental 0.03 0.04 4.70 0.38 0.07 0.04 −12.30 0.02
Ear, nose, and throat 0.02 0.01 −5.10 0.32 0.01 0.01 5.30 0.11
Gastro/Urology 0.02 0.04 12.40 0.03 0.03 0.04 6.60 0.17
General 0.38 0.35 −6.30 0.23 0.32 0.35 5.90 0.17
Lab diagnostics 0.23 0.18 −13.80 0.01 0.19 0.18 −3.60 0.39
Neurology 0.01 0.01 −5.40 0.29 0.01 0.01 −1.90 0.63
Obstetrics 0.03 0.01 −13.30 0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.70 0.85
Ophthalmology 0.04 0.05 6.60 0.22 0.03 0.05 9.40 0.03
Orthopedics 0.02 0.02 −5.00 0.33 0.02 0.02 −3.40 0.42
Physical med 0.05 0.04 −8.60 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.90 0.82
Radiology 0.04 0.08 18.00 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.30 0.95
Surgery 0.03 0.06 13.90 0.01 0.04 0.05 7.10 0.13
Propensity score
(propensity internal-first)
0.56 0.71 0.66 0.66
Standardized bias (mean) 11.0 4.8
Note. Standardized bias: the % difference of the sample means in the treated and nontreated subsamples as a percentage of the square
root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and nontreated groups. A bias score below 5 is a typical rule of thumb
(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008).
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represent full integration. We also ran analyses dropping the firm divisions that adopt hybrid sales
forces, and our results do not change (results available from authors). Unfortunately, given the rare
occurrence of this sales governance mode, we can't separately explore the drivers of the partial inte-
gration of sales, and leave that to future research.
7 | DISCUSSION
In this paper, we explore how relational governance influences firm boundaries. Our context is the
strategic decision to integrate, or keep external, the sales function among U.S. medical device firms.
This decision shapes the ongoing transfer of knowledge between product manufacturers and users
and is therefore relevant both for value creation and value capture (Chatterji & Fabrizio, 2014; Chat-
terji et al., 2008; Danneels, 2002 ; Grant, 1991, 1996). Our findings clarify the influence and limits
of relational capital in shaping the choice to integrate sales. Firms that do not change their focal
downstream market are less likely to integrate the longer they use external sales, whereas we don't
see the same pattern for firms that change their focal downstream market. Further, relational capital
limits the push toward integration for innovating firms.
Our study offers a number of contributions. First, this study contributes to work on the role of
interorganizational relationships in firm strategy. Existing relational governance research focuses on
whether relational governance substitutes for or complements formal contracts (Poppo & Zenger,
2002), finding nuanced results, that is, shared trust leads to less hierarchy (Gulati & Nickerson,
2008), while contracts between experienced partners are more formal (Ryall & Sampson, 2009).
Another strand of relational governance research focuses on why firms to repeatedly choose the same
external partners versus others (Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013; Holloway & Parmigiani, 2016), but
implicitly ignores integration as an option. Our paper fills a gap by focusing on how relational capital
can mitigate the push toward integration. In doing so, this research reintegrates relational governance
into the large literature on firm boundaries.
Second, we theorize and empirically test for the limits of relational capital. Specifically, we pro-
pose that relational capital is embedded within narrow product markets and find empirical support for
this theoretical proposition by demonstrating when relational capital shapes firm boundary decisions.
Our paper, therefore, suggests the explanatory power of relational governance is context dependent.
Relational capital's context embeddedness may provide an important narrative to describe firm per-
formance differences and the consequences of planned changes in organizational design (Joseph,
Baumann, Burton, & Srikanth, 2018).
Additionally, our paper partly reconciles the largely theoretical literature that suggests innovation
sparks changes in firm boundaries (e.g., Kaul, 2012; Teece, 1986) with the dearth of firm boundary
changes observed empirically (Kapoor, 2013; Qian et al., 2012) by highlighting the mitigating role of
relational capital. We also add to the surprisingly limited scholarly work on corporate strategy and
sales (Kleinbaum & Stuart, 2014) a strategic function on which firms spend considerable resources
and one that is crucial to value creation and capture (Danneels, 2002; Grant, 1991, 1996). To our
knowledge, we are the first to track firms' sales-boundary choices over time and explore relational
capital, innovation, and sales governance in tandem.
Our study has some specific empirical limitations. First, although we structure our analysis to mit-
igate reverse causality, our key independent variables—including both relational capital and
innovation—are the outcome of firm strategy. Thus, we cannot fully rule out endogeneity concerns
stemming from an omitted variable driving both firm boundary choices and our key explanatory vari-
ables. For example, firms that are more agile may be more likely to both innovate and change sales
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strategies over time. Further, innovation can be customer driven (von Hippel, 1976), which may
mean that relational capital is a mechanism driving innovation. We are unable to tease out apart these
explanations, but we hope future research can. A second limitation is that we infer rather than directly
measure relationships. If firms change external partners during our analysis, we may be overestimat-
ing the amount of relational capital. However, given prior research that suggests firms are unlikely to
change external partners (Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013; Holloway & Parmigiani, 2016), as well as our
discussions with industry experts that confirm such changes are unlikely, we believe such mismea-
surement is rare. Further, this mismeasurement should bias us against finding any differential effects.
Our setting has some idiosyncratic features, which suggest opportunities for future research. In
medical devices, new-product life cycles are relatively short (i.e., 2 years or less; Kahn, 1991), cus-
tomers are knowledgeable and expect close sales relationships, and products require specific, techni-
cal know-how to use. However, in industries with longer product life cycles, innovating firms may
be more likely to integrate because they have more time to develop new relationships. Further, in
industries where products do not require ongoing knowledge transfer between manufacturers, sales,
and customers, sales would likely be less important for value capture. Studies focusing on industries
with longer product cycles (e.g., agricultural biotechnology (Moeen, 2017)) or on firm-boundaries
other than sales (for instance, component supply in automobiles or aircraft) would help illuminate
how salient the specific features of our context are in explaining the impact of relational capital on
firm boundaries.
Our results advance understanding of the context embedded role of relational governance in firm
boundary decisions. We hope future research will build on our study to delve deeper into the mecha-
nisms by which interfirm relationships shape firm boundaries and firm strategy.
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